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THE WINTER OF DISCONTENT: A CIRCUMSCRIBED 
CHEVRON 
Nicholas R. Bednar† 
 
Now is the winter of our discontent 
Made glorious summer by this sun of York; 
And all the clouds that lour’d upon our house 
In the deep bosom of the ocean buried.1 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Anti-administrativists are poised for a coup d’état. For the last thirty 
years, courts have deferred to federal agencies’ interpretations of law while 
rarely considering the constitutionality of the delegation underlying the 
agencies’ policymaking authority.2 In recent years, the Supreme Court’s 
 
†  Ph.D. Student, Department of Political Science, Vanderbilt University; 
University of Minnesota Law School, J.D. 2016. 
 1. William Shakespeare, Richard III act 1, sc. 1.  
 2. Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116 MICH. 
L. REV. 1, 30 (2017) (showing that agencies win in 77.4 percent of cases where circuit courts 
applied Chevron); Catherine M. Sharkey, State Farm “with Teeth”: Heightened Judicial 
Review in the Absence of Executive Oversight, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1589, 1607 (2014) 
(“Aggressive judicial review of agency action peaked in the mid-twentieth century. Over 
time, although there has been wide variation among and within jurisdictions, the general 
trend has been towards leniency.”); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The 
1
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anti-administrativists—Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, Justice Alito, 
Justice Gorsuch—have called for reconsideration of administrative law’s 
core doctrines and constitutional roots.3 With the appointment of Justice 
Kavanaugh, the anti-administrativists now have a majority on the Supreme 
Court.4 Accordingly, administrative law scholars and practitioners should 
anticipate a doctrinal revolution during the next decade. 
I use “anti-administrativists”5 as shorthand for individuals who believe 
modern administrative law requires reform to ensure fidelity to the United 
States Constitution and the rule of law. In the words of Aaron Nielson, 
anti-administrativists argue that “administrative law can be better as a 
matter of procedural fairness, substantive outcomes, and compliance with 
statutory and constitutional law.”6 At the core of anti-administrative 
ideology is the belief that bureaucratic governance frustrates the separation 
of powers. Agencies exercise the enumerated powers of the other 
branches by promulgating binding rules like Congress,7 interpreting 
 
Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations 
from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1129 (2008) (showing that agencies win in 
76.2 percent of cases where the Supreme Court applied Chevron). 
 3. See, e.g., SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1358 (2018) (“[W]hether 
Chevron should remain is a question we may leave for another day.”); Oil States Energy 
Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1381 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the PTAB violates Article III); Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 
S. Ct. 1199, 1210–11 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring) (“I await a case in which the validity of 
Seminole Rock may be explored through full briefing and argument.”); Free Enter. Fund v. 
Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010) (Roberts, C.J.) (holding that the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act interferes with the President’s constitutional obligations); Whitman v. 
Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 486–87 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“On a future 
day, however, I would be willing to address the question whether our delegation 
jurisprudence has strayed too far from our Founders’ understanding of separation of 
powers.”). 
 4. Christopher J. Walker, Judge Kavanaugh on Administrative Law and Separation 
of Powers, SCOTUSBLOG (Jul. 26, 2018, 2:55 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/07/kavanaugh-on-administrative-law-and-separation-of-
powers [https://perma.cc/8XXA-LHZ2]. 
 5. See Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword: 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under 
Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (2017) (using this phrase). 
 6. Aaron L. Nielson, Confessions of an “Anti-Administrativist,” 131 HARV. L. REV. 
F. 1, 1 (2017). 
 7. See, e.g., Whitman, 531 U.S. at 488 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in judgment) (“I am persuaded that it would be both wiser and more faithful to 
what we have actually done in delegation cases to admit that agency rulemaking authority is 
‘legislative power.’”); Id. at 487 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I believe that there are cases in 
which the principle is intelligible and yet the significance of the delegated decision is simply 
too great for the decision to be called anything other than ‘legislative.’”); Gary Lawson, 
Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 378–95 (2002) (identifying 
2
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statutes like courts,8 and—with respect to independent agencies—acting 
outside the reaches of presidential oversight.9 The strongest anti-
administrativists argue that the entire foundation of the modern 
administrative state violates basic principles of the Constitution.10 More 
lenient anti-administrativists acknowledge that delegation has become an 
integral part of modern government but insist on strict oversight of 
agencies.11 
To be clear, one should not interpret the phrase “anti-
administrativist” as pejorative. While I do not self-identify as an anti-
administrativist,12 I sympathize with their concerns. We should strive for a 
system of government that embraces efficiency, expertise, transparency, 
 
numerous situations where Congress delegated broad “legislative” authority to 
administrative agencies). 
 8. See, e.g., Oil States Energy Servs., LLC, 138 S. Ct. at 1380 (Gorsuch, J., 
dissenting) (“Today, the government invites us to retreat from the promise of judicial 
independence. Until recently, most everyone considered an issued patent a personal right—
no less than a home or farm—that the federal government could revoke only with the 
concurrence of independent judges. But in the statute before us Congress has tapped an 
executive agency, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, for the job.”); Stephen Breyer, 
Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363 (1986) (arguing 
that current standards of review for agency actions swap the intended role for the judiciary). 
 9. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 484 (“The President cannot ‘take Care that the 
Laws be faithfully executed’ if he cannot oversee the faithfulness of the officers who 
execute them.”); PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON ADMIN. MGMT., REPORT WITH SPECIAL 
STUDIES 40–
41 (1937), https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015019768939;view=1up;seq=62 
[https://perma.cc/XXE4-529M] (“The independent commissions present a serious 
immediate problem. No administrative reorganization worthy of the name can leave 
hanging in the air more than a dozen powerful, irresponsible agencies free to determine 
policy and administer law. Any program to restore our constitutional ideal of a fully 
coordinated Executive Branch responsible to the President must bring within the reach of 
that responsible control all work done by these independent commissions which is not 
judicial in nature.”). 
 10. See PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014) 
(answering “Yes” to the question posed in the title). 
 11. See generally Ilan Wurman, Constitutional Administration, 69 STAN. L. REV. 359 
(2017) (arguing that Courts should accept delegation to remedy the undermining of 
separation of powers). 
 12. Notably, I believe the historical record demonstrates that Congress has the 
constitutional authority to “delegate” policymaking decisions to agencies, which the 
agencies resolve through the rulemaking process. See generally JERRY L. MASHAW, 
CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF 
AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2012); ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW’S ABNEGATION: 
FROM LAW’S EMPIRE TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (2016); Eric A. Posner & Adrian 
Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721 (2002). 
3
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and the separation of powers. Anti-administrativists have contributed 
much to the dialogue about how our government should function. Now, 
with a majority on the Supreme Court, they have the opportunity to 
reshape administrative law in ways that comport with their ideology.  
Anti-administrativists have already fired the first shots of the 
revolution at the Chevron standard of review. In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Supreme Court announced 
a two-step standard of review for assessing whether a court should defer to 
an agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute.13 Chevron is 
an easy target. It is the most cited case in administrative law.14 More 
importantly, since its inception, jurists and scholars have warned that 
Chevron has expanded bureaucratic authority by depriving the courts of 
their power to interpret the law.15 In recent years, these concerns have led 
many commentators to call on the Supreme Court to overturn the 
Chevron doctrine and restore de novo review as the proper standard for 
reviewing agency interpretations of law.16 Even Congress has proposed 
legislation that would eliminate Chevron by amending the Administrative 
Procedure Act to require reviewing courts to “decide de novo all relevant 
questions of law, including the interpretation of constitutional and statutory 
provisions, and rules.”17 
Yet it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court will overturn Chevron. 
Elsewhere, Kristin E. Hickman and I argue that deference is the inevitable 
result of Congress’s delegation of policymaking authority to agencies.18 The 
Supreme Court acknowledges that statutory interpretation “is often more a 
question of policy than of law,”19 and policymaking belongs to the political 
 
 13. 467 U.S. 837, 841–43 (1984). 
 14. Nicholas R. Bednar & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Inevitability, 85 GEO. 
WASH L. REV. 1392, 1394 n.5 (2017) (calculating that, as of June 2017, Chevron had been 
cited more than 81,000 times). 
 15. See generally Breyer, supra note 8, at 370–71; Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory 
Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 
452 (1989); Kenneth W. Starr et al., Judicial Review of Administrative Action in a 
Conservative Era, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 353, 350 (1987) (Cass R. Sunstein). 
 16. See generally Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: 
How Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 
779 (2010); Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1187 (2016). But 
see Jeffrey Pojanowski, Without Deference, 81 MO. L. REV. 1975 (2016). 
 17. Separation of Powers Restoration Act, H.R. 4768, 114th Cong. (2016) (emphasis 
added); see also Bednar & Hickman, supra note 14, at 1456–60 (discussing SOPRA’s 
implications for judicial review of agency interpretations of statutes). 
 18. See generally Bednar & Hickman, supra note 14. 
 19. Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696 (1991). 
4
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branches—not the courts.20 Chief Justice Roberts agrees. Dissenting in City 
of Arlington v. FCC, Chief Justice Roberts remarked, “Chevron 
importantly guards against the Judiciary arrogating to itself policymaking 
properly left, under the separation of powers, to the Executive.”21 Indeed, 
courts have long deferred to agency interpretations of statutes to avoid 
straying too far into the policymaking realm.22 Unless the Court revives the 
nondelegation doctrine in its harshest form, Congress will continue to 
delegate policymaking authority to agencies under incomplete statutes, 
agencies will fill the gaps in those statutes, and courts will defer to the 
agencies’ policy decisions. 
However, Hickman and I never suggest that Chevron will live a 
peaceful existence. If Chevron survives, how will it function when the 
Supreme Court completes its anti-administrativist revolution? Although 
Chevron’s boilerplate remains relatively consistent, its application varies 
depending on which judge or justice authors the opinion.23 Chevron’s rigor 
depends on how clear Congress must speak to foreclose deference, how 
reasonable the agency’s interpretation must be to warrant deference, and 
whether the judge applies a formalistic construction of the two steps.24 
Even outside of the anti-administrativist critique, scholars have called on 
the Supreme Court to provide lower courts with more guidance as to when 
and how Chevron applies.25 An anti-administrativist Supreme Court 
could—and undoubtedly will—weaken Chevron without disposing of it. 
 
 20. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 487 n.1 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 21. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 327 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 22. See, e.g., Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 (1977) (“In a situation of this 
kind, Congress entrusts to the Secretary [of Health, Education, and Welfare—the precursor 
to the modern Department of Health & Human Services], rather than to the courts, the 
primary responsibility for interpreting the statutory term . . . . A reviewing court is not free 
to set aside those regulations simply because it would have interpreted the statute in a 
different manner.”); AT&T Co. v. United States, 299 U.S. 232, 236 (1936) (stating the 
Court is “not at liberty to substitute its own discretion for that of administrative officers who 
have kept within the bounds of their administrative powers.”). 
 23. Bednar & Hickman, supra note 14, at 1444–45 (describing Chevron as “just” a 
standard of review). 
 24. Id. at 1446. 
 25. Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Step Two’s Domain, 93 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1441, 1470 (2018) (“The Supreme Court, with plenty of theoretical 
foundation to guide it, should look for ways to bring coherence to the Chevron 
framework.”); Beermann, supra note 16, at 783 (“The Chevron opinion was poorly 
constructed and unclear on basic issues such as the proper role of interpretation, legislative 
history, and policy arguments. It is still not clear whether Chevron concerns review of 
statutory interpretation or review of policy decisions.”). 
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This article draws from current trends among anti-administrativists to 
explore how the Supreme Court may curtail Chevron in future cases. That 
is not to suggest that the Supreme Court will implement all of the changes 
I identify here. Rather, this article is best understood as a menu of à la 
carte options that the Supreme Court may use to address anti-
administrativist concerns. The more limitations that the Supreme Court 
orders, the less often lower courts will defer to agency interpretations of 
law. 
II. THE CRITIQUES AND PERSISTENCE OF CHEVRON 
A. The Chevron Standard 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc,26 provides courts with a two-step standard 
for reviewing “an agency’s construction of [a] statute which it administers.” 
At step one, the court asks whether “Congress has directly spoken to the 
precise question at issue.”27 The court employs all “traditional tools of 
statutory construction” to ascertain Congress’s intent.28 If Congress’s intent 
is clear, then the court “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed 
intent of Congress.”29 “The court need not conclude that the agency 
construction was the only one it permissibly could have adopted to uphold 
the construction, or even the reading the court would have reached if the 
question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding.”30 But “if the statute is 
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,” the court moves to 
step two.31 At step two, the court determines whether the agency’s 
interpretation is “based on a permissible construction of the statute.”32 The 
court must defer to the agency’s interpretation unless it is “arbitrary, 
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”33 
However, the Chevron opinion itself provided little guidance to lower 
courts as to when and how the standard applies. The Chevron Court 
acknowledged that Congress may explicitly or implicitly delegate an issue 
of statutory interpretation to the agency.34 With respect to explicit 
 
 26. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 27. Id. at 842. 
 28. Id. at 843 n.9. 
 29. Id. at 842–43. 
 30. Id. at 843 n.11. 
 31. Id. at 843. 
 32. Id. at 843. 
 33. Id. at 844. 
 34. Id. at 843. 
6
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delegations, the Chevron Court stated, “If Congress has explicitly left a gap 
for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the 
agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation.”35 With 
respect to implicit delegations, the Court stated, “a court may not 
substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable 
interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.”36  
On the face of its opinion, the Chevron Court appears to have 
created a single standard of review for both agency statutory interpretation 
and agency gap-filling. Agencies engage in both statutory interpretation and 
gap-filling while enforcing the law, but scholars treat them as distinct 
agency actions. Statutory interpretation refers to the traditional exercise 
whereby the court decides “what the law is.”37 Courts employ an 
interpretive methodology—typically purposivism or textualism—and their 
various tools (textual canons, substantive canons, legislative history, etc.) to 
arrive at the “best meaning” of the statutory text. Yet some ambiguities 
have no discernable “best meaning” because Congress intended for the 
agency to fill the gaps in these statutes. Filling statutory gaps requires 
policymaking, which is a task suited for the political branches. Courts have 
long recognized the power of administrative agencies to fill gaps in 
Congress’s statutory regimes.38 The historical distinction between statutory 
interpretation and gap-filling has led some scholars to argue that the 
Chevron Court intended to limit the application of Chevron to cases 
involving gap-filling.39  
Along the same lines, the Supreme Court has failed to adequately 
explain Chevron’s scope. For more than fifteen years,40 lower courts 
struggled to decide whether older standards of review remained good law, 
whether the agency had to produce its interpretation through notice-and-
comment rulemaking, and whether certain substantive questions (notably 
those concerning interpretations of the agency’s scope of power) were 
beyond deference.41 Finally, in a trilogy of cases, the Court announced that 
 
 35. Id. at 843–44. 
 36. Id. at 844. 
 37. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 38. Ilan Wurman, The Specification Power (Aug. 6, 2018) (working paper), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3226964 [https://perma.cc/NS4F-
MMAZ]. 
 39. Id. at 22–27 (arguing that several pre-Chevron cases that appear to involve 
statutory interpretation actually involve gap-filling). 
 40. See generally Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 
GEO. L. J. 833 (2001) (summarizing confusion around Chevron’s scope and addressing 
how the Court might resolve this confusion). 
 41. Bednar & Hickman, supra note 14, at 1404–05. 
7
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Chevron applies when the agency promulgated its interpretation pursuant 
to a statutory grant of authority to act with the force of law.42 Since these 
initial cases, the Supreme Court has continued to refine Chevron’s scope 
but, in doing so, has injected further nuance and confusion into the 
doctrine.43 
With respect to the substance of its two steps, the Supreme Court has 
fared even worse.44 The circuit courts continue to differ as to which tools 
are appropriate at step one. Most circuits examine legislative history at step 
one,45 but the Third Circuit does not.46 Major disagreements persist over 
whether and when substantive canons apply in the Chevron analysis.47  
The confusion surrounding step one is not the fault of the Supreme 
Court alone. Judges disagree about which interpretive ideology—textualism 
or purposivism—best determines Congress’s intent.48 Judges also disagree 
about the line between clarity and ambiguity.49 As Justice Scalia predicted 
shortly after Chevron’s inauguration, future battles over acceptance of 
agency interpretations of law would be fought over “[h]ow clear is clear?”50 
In light of these disagreements, step one may take the form of a strong 
textualist inquiry, a strong purposivist inquiry, a weak textualist inquiry, or 
a weak purposivist inquiry. 
The Supreme Court has provided even less guidance about the 
contours of step two. Step two may embrace one of two inquiries. Step two 
 
 42. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001); see also Barnhart v. 
Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002); Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000). 
 43. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (concluding that Chevron does 
not apply to questions of “economic and political significance”); City of Arlington v. FCC, 
569 U.S. 290, 306–07 (2013) (holding that Chevron applies to an agency’s interpretation of 
the scope of its regulatory authority); Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet 
Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005) (“A court’s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps 
an agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court 
decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and 
thus leaves no room for agency discretion.”). 
 44. Bednar & Hickman, supra note 14, at 1419–23 (describing inconsistencies and 
ambiguities within the Chevron opinion’s descriptions of the two steps). 
 45. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. EPA, 781 F.3d 299, 308 (6th Cir. 2015); Sumpter v. Sec’y 
of Labor, 763 F.3d 1292, 1297 (11th Cir. 2014); Catawba Cty. v. EPA, 571 F.3d 20, 35 
(D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 46. United States v. Geiser, 527 F.3d 288, 294 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[L]egislative history 
should not be considered at Chevron step one.”). 
 47. Bednar & Hickman, supra note 14, at 1427. 
 48. Id. at 1446 (arguing that statutory ambiguity is unavoidable). 
 49. Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation. Judging Statutes, 129 HARV. 
L. REV. 2118, (2016) (reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)). 
 50. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 
DUKE L. J. 511, 520–21 (1989).  
8
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may ask “whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute.”51 Under this view, step two acts as a secondary 
interpretive analysis. However, this construction possibly renders step one 
and step two redundant.52 Instead, step two may import the arbitrary-and-
capricious standard of section 706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure 
Act. This approach requires the agency to provide the policymaking 
rationale for its interpretation.53 Since Chevron’s inception, courts have 
expressed confusion about whether the Chevron Court intended the 
interpretive or the arbitrary-and-capricious form of step two.54 The 
Supreme Court has invalidated an agency’s interpretation at step two in 
only four cases and, within these cases, has done little to explain step two’s 
role. 55 
In sum, the Supreme Court has provided little guidance as to how 
Chevron should apply.56 Chevron is simply a standard of review, which—
like many other standards of review—evolves as judges apply it in new 
situations.57 Many versions of Chevron have emerged over the years. 
Chevron is malleable, and its malleability is perhaps its greatest asset for an 
anti-administrativist Supreme Court. 
B. The Inevitability of Deference and Delegation 
Chevron’s survival presumes that delegation survives. Deference is 
the byproduct of delegation, and without delegation, the Supreme Court 
can abandon deference.58 In theory, Congress could stop delegating 
policymaking authority to administrative agencies. In reality, Congress 
builds the scaffolding necessary for regulatory programs and leaves 
agencies to use their expertise to finish the structure. Congressional staffers 
 
 51. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) 
(emphasis added). 
 52. Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 
VA. L. REV. 597, 599 (2009). 
 53. Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1253, 1270 (1997). 
 54. 744 F.2d 133, 150–51, 151 n.46 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 55. See Barnett & Walker, supra note 25, at 1448–51 n.83 (discussing four cases: 
Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015); Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302 
(2014); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006); and AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Util. Bd., 
525 U.S. 366 (1999)). 
 56. Bednar & Hickman, supra note 14, at 1418–41. 
 57. Id. at 1444–45 (quoting Martha S. Davis & Steven Alan Childress, Standards of 
Review in Criminal Appeals: Fifth Circuit Illustration and Analysis, 60 TUL. L. REV. 461, 
561 (1986)). 
 58. Bednar & Hickman, supra note 14, at 1453–56.  
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routinely asks the implementing agency for assistance in drafting legislative 
proposals to ensure that Congress provides the agency with a sufficient 
foundation to implement the regulatory regime.59 Moreover, delegation 
allows members of Congress to shift blame for politically undesirable 
policies to administrative agencies.60 Even if Congress could stop 
delegating, it is unlikely to do so. If the Supreme Court truly wishes to 
jettison Chevron, it will need to revive the nondelegation doctrine. 
However, a complete revival of the nondelegation doctrine also seems 
unlikely.61  
The traditional anti-administrativist narrative argues that the Supreme 
Court readily enforced principles of nondelegation until the New Deal but 
abandoned these principles shortly thereafter. John Locke professed that 
the legislature—having been granted authority to make laws by the people—
“can have no power to transfer their authority of making laws, and place it 
in other hands.”62 The Supreme Court recognized the Lockean 
nondelegation principle in Article I’s Vesting Clause, which vests “[a]ll 
legislative Powers”63 in Congress and, by implication, excludes the exercise 
of legislative power by other branches.64 Beginning in 1887, Congress 
began to reorganize the federal government by building a vast 
administrative state to manage new regulatory programs that policed 
business and transportation.65 The courts actively resisted the delegation of 
 
 59. Christopher J. Walker, Legislating in the Shadows, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1377, 
1388–89 (2017). 
 60. See SARAH BINDER & MARK SPINDEL, THE MYTH OF INDEPENDENCE: HOW 
CONGRESS GOVERNS THE FEDERAL RESERVE 45–51 (2017) (describing this dynamic 
between Congress and the Federal Reserve); DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE 
ELECTORAL CONNECTION 52–54 (1974). 
 61. Bednar & Hickman, supra note 14, at 1398. 
 62. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, ch. XI, § 141 (1690). 
 63. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 64. Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 693–94 (1892) (“The true 
distinction . . . is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily 
involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its 
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to 
the latter no valid objection can be made.”) (quoting Cincinnati, W & Z. R.R. Co. v. 
Comm’r of Clinton Cty., 1 Ohio St. 77, 88–89 (1852)). Some trace the origins of the 
nondelegation doctrine to The Aurora, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 (1812). See RICHARD J. 
PIERCE, JR., 1 ADMIN. LAW TREATISE § 2.6 (2010). However, the clearest statement of the 
nondelegation rule comes from Field v. Clark. 
 65. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 439 (2d ed. 1985) 
(“[T]he development of administrative law seems mostly a contribution of the 20th 
century. . . . The creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission, in 1887, has been 
taken to be a kind of genesis.”); see generally STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW 
10
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 2
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol45/iss2/2
  
2019] WINTER OF DISCONTENT: CIRCUMSCRIBED CHEVRON 403 
policymaking authority to this “headless” fourth branch of government.66 
At the climax of this narrative, in 1935, the Supreme Court struck down 
New Deal legislation for violating the nondelegation doctrine.67 Shortly 
thereafter, the Court stopped caring about unconstitutional delegations, 
failing to invalidate even “easy kills.”68 By 1989, the Supreme Court had 
interred the nondelegation doctrine.69 
Whether the anti-administrativists’ narrative accurately portrays 
history has little bearing on whether the Supreme Court will revive the 
nondelegation doctrine.70 Indeed, many anti-administrativists continue to 
point to The Federalist No. 47 and its decree that “[t]he accumulation of 
all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands . . . may 
justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny” as a sign that the 
Founders intended for the Constitution to prevent delegations.71 At a 
minimum, Chief Justice Roberts is undoubtedly correct that “[t]he 
Framers could hardly have envisioned today’s ‘vast and varied federal 
bureaucracy’ and the authority administrative agencies now hold over our 
economic, social, and political activities.”72 
 
AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES 1877–
1920, at 285–92 (1982). 
 66. Metzger, supra note 5 (noting attacks on the administrative state by the Supreme 
Court).  
 67. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry 
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).  
 68. See Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. 
REV. 1231, 1240 (1994). 
 69. Id. at 1240 (“The Supreme Court . . . has rejected so many delegation challenges 
to so many utterly vacuous statutes that modern nondelegation decisions now simply recite 
these past holdings and wearily move on.”); see also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 
361, 378–79 (1989). 
 70. For sources challenging this narrative, see Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 
U.S. 457, 488 (2001) (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that Article I does not “purport to 
limit the authority of either [the Executive or the Legislature] to delegate authority to 
others”); JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST 
ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 44–50 (2012); Keith E. 
Whittington & Jason Iuliano, The Myth of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 165 U. PA. L. 
REV. 379, 429–30 (2017) (conducting an empirical study of early nondelegation cases and 
concluding that the courts never meaningfully enforced the doctrine); Posner & Vermeule, 
supra note 12, at 1729–41 (evaluating the potential sources of legitimacy for the 
nondelegation and coming up empty handed). 
 71. United States v. Nichols, 784 F.3d 666, 670 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 298 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)); City of 
Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 1877 (2013). 
 72. City of Arlington, 569 U.S. at 1878 (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. 
Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 499 (2010)). 
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But even anti-administrativists acknowledge that “the Court does not 
want to tear everything down.”73 In the end, as Gary Lawson suggests, “the 
Court believes—possibly correctly—that the modern administrative state 
could not function if Congress were actually required to make a significant 
percentage of the fundamental policy decisions.”74 The Court itself has 
acknowledged that “in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever 
changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job 
absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.”75 
Perhaps the administrative state has become too big to fail. During oral 
arguments in the Supreme Court’s most recent nondelegation case, Gundy 
v. United States, Justice Breyer expressed concerns that the petitioners’ 
approach to the nondelegation doctrine would require overturning the 
300,000 regulations on the books.76  
The Supreme Court’s anti-administrativists have more or less 
acquiesced to delegation. Justice Alito suggests that “the formal reason why 
the Court does not enforce the nondelegation doctrine with more vigilance 
is that the other branches of Government have vested powers of their own 
that can be used in ways that resemble lawmaking.”77 Meaningful 
enforcement of the modern nondelegation doctrine requires assessing 
when administrative policymaking strays too far into the realm of 
“legislating.” As Justice Scalia stated in Whitman v. American Trucking 
Ass’n, the Court has “almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress 
regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to 
those executing or applying the law.”78 To avoid directly tackling the 
problem of delegation, conservatives often justify administrative 
rulemaking as a constitutional exercise of the executive power incidental to 
the enforcement of the law.79  
 
 73. Nielson, supra note 6, at 10. 
 74. Lawson, supra note 68, at 1241. 
 75. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989). 
 76. Transcript of Oral Argument at 7:18–9:1, Gundy v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 
1260 (2018) (No. 17-6086), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2018/17-
6086_6khn.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2LN-BSEL]. But see id. at 8:18–19, 26:5–16 
(questioning the accuracy of the 300,000 figure).  
 77. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1237 (2015) (Alito, J., 
concurring). 
 78. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 474–75 (2001) (quoting 
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).  
 79. See Ass’n of Am. R.R. at 1237 (citing City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 
328 n.4 (2013)); Whitman, 531 U.S. at 475 (“It is true enough that the degree of agency 
discretion that is acceptable varies according to the scope of the power congressionally 
conferred.”). 
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Although Justices Thomas and Gorsuch continue to endorse a revival 
of the nondelegation doctrine, it seems improbable that the Supreme 
Court will revive the doctrine in any meaningful way.80 It is quite possible 
that the Supreme Court will begin to enforce the nondelegation doctrine 
in the most egregious cases. The Court has one such opportunity during 
the 2018-2019 term in Gundy v. United States.81 But few of the anti-
administrativist justices appear to have interest in using the nondelegation 
doctrine to wholly demolish the administrative state. 
If delegation is here to stay, so too is deference.82 Kristin Hickman 
and I argue, “Chevron is a byproduct of congressional delegation.”83 The 
Chevron Court recognized that the interpretation of regulatory statutes 
often involves policymaking: 
When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory 
provision, fairly conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of 
the agency’s policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice 
within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail. In 
such a case, federal judges—who have no constituency—have a 
duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do. 
The responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy 
choices and resolving the struggle between competing views of 
the public interest are not judicial ones: “Our Constitution vests 
such responsibilities in the political branches.”84 
In other words, with or without Chevron, courts must defer to 
agencies’ reasonable interpretations of statutes to avoid policymaking.85 
Moreover, Congress wants agencies to use their policy and scientific 
expertise to fill statutory gaps.86 Congressional staffers agree that Congress 
 
 80. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 487 (“I am not convinced that the intelligible principle 
doctrine serves to prevent all cessions of legislative power. I believe that there are cases in 
which the principle is intelligible and yet the significance of the delegated decision is simply 
too great for the decision to be called anything other than ‘legislative.’”); United States v. 
Nichols, 784 F.3d 666, 671 (10th Cir. 2015) (“[H]ow do you know an impermissible 
delegation of legislative authority when you see it? By its own telling, the Court has had a 
hard time devising a satisfying answer. But the difficulty of the inquiry doesn’t mean it isn’t 
worth the effort.” (citation omitted)). 
 81. Mila Sohoni, Argument Analysis: Justices Grapple with Nondelegation Challenge, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 3, 2018, 1:33 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/10/argument-
analysis-justices-grapple-with-nondelegation-challenge [https://perma.cc/F2UA-YXXJ]. 
 82. Bednar & Hickman, supra note 14, at 1453. 
 83. Id. at 1443. 
 84. Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984) 
(quoting TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978)). 
 85. See Bednar & Hickman, supra note 14, at 1460. 
 86. Id. at 1454. 
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intends to delegate interpretive authority to agencies rather than the 
courts.87 Deference is a necessary component of the administrative state 
because it gives agencies flexibility to implement policy decisions and 
courts an exit from cases that otherwise require them to intervene in the 
policymaking process. 
C. Anti-Administrativist Critiques of Chevron 
Accepting Chevron’s persistence, how should the Supreme Court 
resolve concerns that Chevron transfers authority from the courts and 
Congress in ways that frustrate the separation of powers?88   
By far the most recurring critique of Chevron is that it transfers to 
agencies the power to “say what the law is” by allowing them to engage in 
near-binding statutory interpretation.89 Shortly after the Supreme Court 
announced Chevron, Justice Breyer warned that a strong reading of the 
standard would result in “a greater abdication of judicial responsibility to 
interpret the law than seems wise.”90 More recently, in a concurring 
opinion in Michigan v. EPA, Justice Thomas argued that Chevron “wrests 
from Courts the ultimate interpretive authority to ‘say what the law is’ and 
hands it over to the Executive” in violation of Article III.91 Philip 
Hamburger places the blame on the judges who continue to defer to 
agency interpretations of law, claiming that American judges have 
“abandoned” the bench.92 
These concerns were made even more complicated by the Supreme 
Court’s holding in National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand 
X Internet Services.93 In Brand X, the Supreme Court held that “[a] 
court’s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency 
construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior 
court decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous 
terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion.”94 
Dissenting, Justice Scalia warned that the decision effectively allows the 
 
 87. Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Shultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the 
Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 
65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 994 (2013). 
 88. Kavanaugh, supra note 49, at 2150; Beermann, supra note 16, at 782–84. 
 89. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 90. Breyer, supra note 8, at 381. 
 91. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting 
Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177). 
 92. HAMBURGER, supra note 10, at 316.   
 93. 545 U.S. 967, 982–85 (2005). 
 94. Id. at 982. 
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agency to set aside binding precedent by reinterpreting the statute and 
seeking deference.95 In the majority opinion, Justice Thomas disagreed, 
arguing that the Court’s previous interpretation remains “binding law,” and 
the agency—consistent with the Court’s finding of ambiguity—may change 
its interpretation of the statute as the authoritative interpreter of the 
statute.96  
In a lengthy critique of Chevron and Brand X, then-Judge Gorsuch 
argued that the Founders sought to prevent the politicization of the courts 
by preventing the elected branches of government from overturning the 
courts’ decisions.97 He expressed concerns that Brand X allows the 
executive branch to reverse the court’s interpretation of the law.98 More 
broadly, Gorsuch emphasized that Chevron abdicates judicial authority by 
allowing agencies to create binding interpretations of statutes.99 
Not all anti-administrativist judges seem concerned that Chevron 
violates Article III. As Chief Justice Roberts observed in his dissent in City 
of Arlington v. FCC, “We do not ignore [Marbury v. Madison] when we 
afford an agency’s statutory interpretation Chevron deference; we respect 
it. We give binding deference to permissible agency interpretations of 
statutory ambiguities because Congress has delegated to the agency the 
authority to interpret those ambiguities ‘with the force of law.’”100  
One can avoid Chevron’s Article III concerns by restricting its 
application to agency gap-filling. However, some view the gap-filling 
framework as an effort to avoid the nondelegation doctrine. As Justice 
Thomas stated in Michigan v. EPA, “Although acknowledging this fact 
might allow us to escape the jaws of Article III’s Vesting Clause, it runs 
headlong into the teeth of Article I’s, which vests ‘[a]ll legislative Powers 
herein granted’ in Congress.”101 Cynthia Farina recognizes that Chevron 
shifts policymaking authority from Congress to the President: 
At stake in Chevron was the fate of one relatively small but not 
insignificant slice of the regulatory power pie: the authority to 
interpret the statutes that define the policy-making universe. The 
Court’s resolution deliberately moves that power squarely into 
 
 95. Id. at 1017 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 96. Id. at 982–83. 
 97. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149–50 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, 
J., concurring). 
 98. Id.  
 99. See id. at 1152. 
 100. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 317 (2013) (quoting United States v. 
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001)). 
 101. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2713 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 1). 
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the President’s domain. By relinquishing the authority to 
determine statutory “meaning” to agencies whenever Congress 
has failed to speak clearly and precisely, Chevron enlarges the 
quantum of administrative discretion potentially amenable to 
direction from the White House. It then goes even further and 
exhorts agencies to exercise this discretion, not by attempting to 
intuit and realize the objectives of the statue’s enactors, but by 
pursuing the regulatory agenda of the current Chief Executive.102 
Likewise, Cass Sunstein calls Chevron “the quintessential 
prodelegation canon” because it rests on an assumption of “implicit 
delegations of interpretive (realistically, lawmaking) authority to 
agencies.”103 Again, this concern resonates less with those judges who view 
delegation as a modern necessity. To that end, Justice Kavanaugh sees a 
role for Chevron in some cases:  
All of that said, Chevron makes a lot of sense in certain 
circumstances. It affords agencies discretion over how to 
exercise authority delegated to them by Congress. . . . The 
theory is that Congress delegates the decision to an executive 
branch agency that makes the policy decision, and that the 
courts should stay out of it for the most part. That all makes a 
great deal of sense and, in some ways, represents the proper 
conjunction of the Chevron and State Farm doctrines.104  
Even Justice Gorsuch—an ardent fan of the nondelegation doctrine—
acknowledges that agencies have an inherent authority to fill gaps in 
statutes.105 
Anti-administrativists also argue that Chevron allows agencies to 
expand the scope of their regulatory authority beyond Congress’s intended 
delegation. Drawing from his personal experience in the White House, 
Justice Kavanaugh states, “I can confidently say that Chevron encourages 
the Executive Branch (whichever party controls it) to be extremely 
aggressive in seeking to squeeze its policy goals into ill-fitting statutory 
authorizations and restraints.”106  
The Supreme Court’s decision in City of Arlington v. FCC 
exacerbated these concerns. In that case, the Supreme Court held that 
Chevron applies to agency’s interpretation of the scope of its regulatory 
 
 102. Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the 
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 525 (1989) (emphasis added). 
 103. Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 329–30 (2000). 
 104. Kavanaugh, supra note 49, at 2152. 
 105. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1154 (10th Cir. 2016). 
 106. Kavanaugh, supra note 49, at 2150. 
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authority.107 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia argued that there is no 
distinction between “jurisdictional” interpretations (those that concern the 
agency’s scope of authority) and “nonjurisdictional” interpretations: 
 The false dichotomy between “jurisdictional” and 
“nonjurisdictional” agency interpretations may be no more than 
a bogeyman, but it is dangerous all the same. . . . Make no 
mistake—the ultimate target here is Chevron itself. Savvy 
challengers of agency action would play the “jurisdictional” card 
in every case. Some judges would be deceived by the specious, 
but scary-sounding, “jurisdictional”-”nonjurisdictional” line; 
others tempted by the prospect of making public policy by 
prescribing the meaning of ambiguous statutory commands. 
The effect would be to transfer any number of interpretive 
decisions—archetypal Chevron questions, about how best to 
construe an ambiguous term in light of competing policy 
interests—from the agencies that administer the statutes to 
federal courts.108 
Indeed, Justice Scalia’s premonition may sound quite compelling to 
those who seek to keep the power of statutory interpretation in the courts. 
In a dissent joined by Justices Kennedy and Alito, Chief Justice Roberts 
warned of “the danger posed by the growing power of the administrative 
state.”109 Courts—not agencies—must decide whether Congress intended to 
delegate authority for an agency to decide a particular ambiguity within a 
statute.110 In sum, courts cannot “leave it to the agency to decide when it is 
in charge.”111  
Nathan Sales and Jonathan Adler offer a scholarly explanation as to 
why agencies should not receive deference for interpretations of their 
regulatory jurisdiction.112 According to Sales and Adler, deference to 
jurisdictional interpretations interferes with the “legislative deal” by 
allowing the agency to expand the scope of its statutory authority beyond 
what the relevant interest groups may have intended.113 In sum, Sales and 
Adler argue that deference to jurisdictional questions leads to agency self-
aggrandizement and an unwarranted expansion of regulatory authority.114  
 
 107. City of Arlington v FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 1871–75 (2013). 
 108. Id. at 1872–73 (citation omitted). 
 109. Id. at 1879 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 110. Id. at 1883. 
 111. Id. at 1886. 
 112. Nathan Alexander Sales & Jonathan H. Adler, The Rest is Silence: Chevron 
Deference, Agency Jurisdiction, and Statutory Silences, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1497 (2009).  
 113. Id. at 1541–42. 
 114. Id. at 1551–54. 
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As this section shows, there is no single strand of anti-administrativist 
ideology. The justices each worry about different normative and 
constitutional problems that arise from Chevron. Certain efforts to revise 
Chevron will appeal to some anti-administrativists more than others. The 
remainder of this article examines how an anti-administrativist Supreme 
Court may pare Chevron’s scope and substance to reduce separation-of-
powers concerns.  
III. CHEVRON’S SCOPE 
Many of the anti-administrativists’ concerns relate to Chevron’s 
scope. An expansive view of Chevron’s scope allows agencies to 
unconstitutionally exercise the powers of the other branches of 
government. For example, anti-administrativists argue that statutory 
interpretation—as opposed to gap-filling—falls within the exclusive power of 
the courts and cannot be exercised by administrative agencies. Moreover, 
many anti-administrativists argue that Congress should decide the scope of 
an agency’s authority, and Chevron should not enable agencies to 
unilaterally expand their authority. This Part addresses how an anti-
administrativist Supreme Court may curb Chevron’s scope to better 
respect the separations of powers. Part II.A. examines how the Supreme 
Court may use the major-questions doctrine to prevent agencies from 
deciding “major” questions that the Court believes ought to be left to 
Congress. Part II.B. describes how the Supreme Court may restore 
judicial power by limiting Chevron’s application to gap-filling. 
A. The Major-Questions Doctrine 
The major-questions doctrine prevents agencies from deciding 
questions of “economic and political significance” without express 
statutory approval from Congress.115  
The doctrine finds its earliest roots in MCI Telecommunications 
Corp. v. AT&T Co.116 In that case, the Supreme Court considered whether 
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) permissibly interpreted 
the Communications Act of 1934 in waiving rate-filing requirements for all 
nondominant long-distance carriers.117 The petitioner—a nondominant 
 
 115. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (citation omitted). For more 
thorough examinations of the major-questions doctrine, see generally Blake Emerson, 
Administrative Answers to Major Questions: On the Democratic Legitimacy of Agency 
Statutory Interpretation, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2019 (2018). 
 116. 512 U.S. 218 (1994). 
 117. Id. at 220. 
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long-distance carrier—sought deference for the agency’s interpretation 
because the statute permitted FCC to “modify” any of the Act’s rate-filing 
requirements.118 Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia observed that “[r]ate 
filings are, in fact, the essential characteristic of a rate-regulated industry.”119 
By exempting certain carriers from filing rates with the FCC, the agency 
made it impossible for customers to enforce their rights against the 
exempted carriers. Scalia reasoned, “It is highly unlikely that Congress 
would leave the determination of whether an industry will be entirely, or 
even substantially, rate-regulated to agency discretion—and even more 
unlikely that it would achieve that through such a subtle device as 
permission to ‘modify’ rate-filing requirements.”120 
In FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., the Supreme Court 
declined to defer to a Food & Drug Administration (FDA) interpretation 
of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act that permitted the agency to regulate 
nicotine as a “drug” and tobacco products as “devices.”121 Writing for the 
Court, Justice O’Connor reviewed the extensive history of tobacco 
legislation and concluded that Congress viewed itself as the primary 
regulator of tobacco and could not have intended for FDA to regulate 
nicotine under the Act.122 Justice O’Connor drew from MCI 
Telecommunications’s proposition that Congress would not leave to an 
agency the choice of whether a whole industry is subject to a regulatory 
scheme. Justice O’Connor described a general principle that “[i]n 
extraordinary cases . . . there may be reason to hesitate before concluding 
that Congress has intended such an implicit delegation” of interpretive 
authority.123 The Court was “obliged to defer not to the agency’s expansive 
construction of the statute, but to Congress’ consistent judgment to deny 
the FDA this power” in light of tobacco’s “unique political history.”124 
Simply put, “Congress could not have intended to delegate a decision of 
such economic and political significance to an agency in so cryptic a 
fashion.”125 
Over a decade later, Chief Justice Roberts reinvigorated Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco. In King v. Burwell, the Supreme Court considered 
whether to defer to the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) interpretation of 
 
 118. Id. at 224 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 203). 
 119. Id. at 231. 
 120. Id.  
 121. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 125–29 (2000). 
 122. Id. at 144–57. 
 123. Id. at 159. 
 124. Id. at 159–60. 
 125. Id. at 160. 
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the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) to award tax credits under the 
Affordable Care Act to individuals who purchased health insurance on a 
federal exchange.126 Under normal circumstances, the Court reviews IRS 
interpretations of the IRC under Chevron.127 But the Court refused to 
apply Chevron in this case. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts 
argued that the IRS’s interpretation did not warrant consideration under 
Chevron because it concerned a question of “deep ‘economic and political 
significance.’”128 As evidence of the question’s significance, he cited 
concerns that the interpretation involved billions of dollars and affected 
the healthcare plans of millions of people.129 He further reasoned that the 
IRS “has no expertise in crafting health insurance policy” and, therefore, 
Congress would have expressly stated if it wished the IRS to resolve this 
question.130 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court still adopted the 
interpretation advanced by the IRS as the best reading of the statute. 
Shortly after the Court decided King v. Burwell, Kristin Hickman 
argued that Chief Justice Robert used King v. Burwell to change Chevron’s 
scope in a way that comported with his dissent in City of Arlington v. 
FCC.131 In City of Arlington, Chief Justice Roberts argued that, in order for 
Chevron to apply, Congress must have intended for the agency to resolve 
the ambiguity in the specific statutory provision at issue.132 Hickman 
speculated that King v. Burwell did not necessarily “signal a new beginning 
for Brown & Williamson Tobacco’s extraordinary cases language as a new 
limitation on Chevron’s scope.”133 “[I]f a majority of the Justices are not 
really on board with the doctrinal adjustment, then much like Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco, King v. Burwell will fade into obscurity as 
doctrinally insignificant with respect to Chevron’s scope.”134 But she 
acknowledged, “sometimes a decision will take on a life of its own.”135 
Three years have passed, and we see signs that the major-questions 
doctrine may persist as a permanent limitation on Chevron’s scope. Since 
King v. Burwell, several lower courts have applied the major-questions 
doctrine. In Texas v. United States, the Fifth Circuit considered whether 
 
 126. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488 (2015).  
 127. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Res. v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 55 (2011). 
 128. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489. 
 129. Id. at 2488–89. 
 130. Id. at 2489. 
 131. Kristin E. Hickman, The (Perhaps) Unintended Consequences of King v. 
Burwell, 2015 PEPP. L. REV. 56, 58 (2015).  
 132. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 1880–83 (2013). 
 133. Hickman, supra note 131, at 64. 
 134. Id. at 66. 
 135. Id. at 71. 
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the Department of Homeland Security exceeded its statutory authority in 
creating the Deferred Action for Parents of American and Lawful 
Permanent Residents program (DAPA), which permitted certain 
undocumented-immigrant parents of United States citizen children to 
remain in the United States.136 The Fifth Circuit held that “DAPA 
undoubtedly implicate[d] ‘questions of deep “economic and political 
significance”’” because the program “would make 4.3 million otherwise 
removable aliens eligible for lawful presence, employment authorization, 
and associated benefits.”137 Similarly, in Chamber of Commerce v. 
Department of Labor, the Fifth Circuit used the major-questions doctrine 
at Chevron step two to invalidate the Department of Labor’s fiduciary rule 
to transform the workings of “trillion-dollar markets” for IRA investments, 
annuities, and insurance products.138 These are just two examples.139 
However, the most important post-King application comes from 
then-Judge Kavanaugh of the D.C. Circuit. Dissenting in United States 
Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, Judge Kavanaugh presented the most coherent 
articulation of the major-questions doctrine.140 He began with an extensive 
review of the Supreme Court cases invoking the major-questions doctrine 
and the scholarly literature exploring this precedent.141 Following this 
review, Judge Kavanaugh stated, “the major rules doctrine constitutes an 
important principle of statutory interpretation in agency cases.”142 He then 
described the standard as follows: “In order for the FCC to issue a major 
rule, Congress must provide clear authorization. We therefore must 
address two questions in this case: (1) Is the net neutrality rule a major 
rule? (2) If so, has Congress clearly authorized the FCC to issue the net 
neutrality rule?”143 
 
 136. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015).  
 137. Id. at 181 (citation omitted). 
 138. Chamber of Commerce v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 885 F.3d 360, 363 (5th Cir. 
2018). 
 139. For further example of lower courts recognizing the major-questions doctrine as a 
limitation on Chevron’s scope, see Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 883 F.3d 
233, 291–92 (4th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (Gregory, J., concurring); New Mexico v. Dep’t of 
Interior, 854 F.3d 1207, 1221–27 (10th Cir. 2017); Michael Coenen & Seth Davis, Minor 
Courts, Major Questions, 70 VAND. L. REV. 777, 796–99 (2017) (discussing the application 
of the major-questions doctrine in the lower courts after King v. Burwell). 
 140. United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 417 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (en 
banc) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing). 
 141. Id. at 419–22. 
 142. Id. at 422. 
 143. Id.  
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In answering the first question, Judge Kavanaugh considered “the 
amount of money involved for regulated and affected parties, the overall 
impact on the economy, the number of people affected, . . . the degree of 
congressional and public attention to the issue,” and whether the agency 
relied on a long-extant statute to support a “bold new assertion of 
regulatory authority.”144 Despite Judge Kavanaugh’s best efforts to draw a 
workable standard from the Supreme Court’s precedent, he admitted, “To 
be sure, determining whether a rule constitutes a major rule sometimes 
has a bit of a ‘know it when you see it’ quality.”145 He concluded that the 
FCC’s net-neutrality rule was a major rule because the rule had a 
“staggering” impact on the economy, Congress had attempted to pass 
legislation concerning net neutrality for years, and the FCC relied on the 
Communications Act of 1934 to assert control over a twenty-first century 
issue.146  
He then turned to whether Congress clearly authorized the FCC to 
promulgate the net-neutrality rule. Examining the Communications Act, 
he noted that Congress “articulated a general philosophy of limited 
regulation of the Internet” and that the FCC had adhered to that 
philosophy until 2015 by classifying the Internet as an “information 
service.”147 To create the net-neutrality regulations, FCC re-classified the 
Internet as a “telecommunications service” in order to regulate internet-
service providers as common carriers.148 Judge Kavanaugh concluded that 
Congress did not clearly authorize such a classification because “the Act is 
ambiguous about whether Internet service is an information service or a 
telecommunications service.”149 Judge Kavanaugh’s dissent offers a 
template for other courts seeking to invoke the major-questions doctrine. 
Chief Judge Roberts and Judge Kavanaugh may not be the only anti-
administrativist justices to adopt the major-questions doctrine. In his 
concurrence in Whitman, Justice Thomas opined that the current 
formulation of the nondelegation doctrine—the “intelligible principle” 
standard—still permits too much cession of power because “there are cases 
in which the principle is intelligible and yet the significance of the 
delegated decision is simply too great for the decision to be called anything 
other than ‘legislative.’”150 The major-questions doctrine offers a partial 
 
 144. Id. at 422–23. 
 145. Id. at 423.  
 146. Id. at 423–24. 
 147. Id. at 424. 
 148. Id. at 425. 
 149. Id. at 424.  
 150. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 487 (2001). 
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remedy to Justice Thomas’s concerns. At the very least, the major-
questions doctrine prevents agencies from delegating politically and 
economically significant decisions to themselves. 
The major-questions doctrine pairs well with anti-administrativist 
concerns about the delegation of too much authority to agencies. Kent 
Barnett and Chris Walker argue that the major-questions doctrine 
perfectly comports with the theoretical underpinnings of Chevron.151 
Chevron applies when Congress has delegated authority to the agency to 
resolve ambiguities or fill gaps in statutes. Absent delegation, however, the 
agency lacks the authority to do either of these things. The major-
questions doctrine asks courts to stop and ask whether Congress really 
intended for the agency to decide the issue before simply deferring to the 
agency’s interpretation.152 It protects against situations where a territorial 
agency seeks to unilaterally expand its authority into new policy areas.153  
The doctrine also acts as a complement to the nondelegation 
doctrine by demanding that Congress specify when it wants an agency to 
decide a significant question. Major questions look like major 
delegations.154 If Congress revises the statute and explicitly delegates to the 
agency the authority to decide the major issue, a reviewing court can 
decide whether the delegation violates the nondelegation doctrine—
assuming the Supreme Court breathes life into the nondelegation doctrine. 
Until then, the major-questions doctrine acts as a check on agencies from 
unilaterally expanding their authority beyond the metes and bounds 
envisioned by Congress. 
B. Interpretation v. Gap-Filling 
As described above, Chevron applies to agency statutory 
interpretation and gap-filling. The administrative state is replete with 
examples of statutes that require gap-filling. Congress does not want to 
decide what constitutes a “safe drug,” a “reasonable hazard,” or a 
 
 151. Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Short-Circuiting the New Major 
Questions Doctrine, 70 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 147, 155 (2017). 
 152. Id. at 156. 
 153. Jonathan H. Adler, Restoring Chevron’s Domain, 81 MO. L. REV. 983, 993 
(2017) (“Where it is unlikely or implausible that Congress would have delegated 
interpretive authority to an administrative agency, there should be no Chevron 
deference.”). 
 154. Coenen & Davis, supra note 139, at 806 (“When, in particular, a statutory 
ambiguity implicates a ‘major question,’ the resolution of that ambiguity starts to look more 
‘legislative’ in character.”). 
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“crashworthy automobile.”155 The courts are regularly called upon to 
determine whether an agency has permissibly “interpreted” Congress’s 
directive.156  
Justice Kavanaugh argues that Chevron should only apply in 
situations where the agency has engaged in gap-filling.157 He argues that 
deference is appropriate “in cases involving statutes using broad and open-
ended terms like ‘reasonable,’ ‘appropriate,’ feasible,’ or ‘practicable.’”158 
Indeed, these terms are the hallmark signals of Congress’s intent for the 
agency to fill a statutory gap. According to Justice Kavanaugh, courts have 
a duty to ensure that the agency “choose[s] among reasonable options 
allowed by the text of the statute” and to ensure that the agency has not 
engaged in arbitrary-and-capricious decision-making.159 
However, “in cases where an agency is instead interpreting a specific 
statutory term or phrase, courts should determine whether the agency’s 
interpretation is the best reading of the statutory text.”160 Absent these 
restrictions on Chevron, Justice Kavanaugh fears that “[i]n certain major 
Chevron cases, different judges will reach different results even though 
they may actually agree on what is the best reading of the statutory text.”161 
While still a judge on the Tenth Circuit, Justice Gorsuch 
acknowledged that, even under the nondelegation doctrine, agencies 
possess the authority to fill gaps in statutory regimes: 
Congress can leave “details” to the Executive. Congress can’t 
punt to the President the job of devising a competition code for 
the chicken industry. Such widely applicable rules governing 
private conduct must be enacted by the Legislature. But once 
Congress enacts a detailed statutory scheme on its own—once it 
says, for example, that margarine manufacturers must pay a tax 
and place a stamp on their packages showing the tax has been 
paid—Congress may leave to the President “details” like 
designing an appropriate tax stamp.”162 
 
 155. JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND 
WHY THEY DO IT 246 (1989). 
 156. Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 217–20 (2009). 
 157. Brett M. Kavanaugh, Book Note, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. 
REV. 2118, 2160 (2016) (reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)). 
 158. Id. at 2153. 
 159. Id. at 2153–54. 
 160. Id. at 2154. 
 161. Id. at 2153. 
 162. United States v. Nichols, 784 F.3d 666, 671 (10th Cir. 2015) (Gorsuch, J., 
dissenting) (citations omitted). 
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In Gutierrez-Brizuela, Justice Gorsuch suggested that Chevron would 
serve as an acceptable standard if limited to situations where Congress 
allowed the agency to fill the gaps in a statute.163 
Limiting the application of Chevron to situations where the agency 
has filled a gap in the statute restores the power of statutory interpretation 
to the Judiciary. Recent work by Ilan Wurman suggests that the Founders 
believed that the executive branch had an inherent constitutional power to 
fill the gaps in statutes.164 Limiting Chevron’s application to cases where the 
agency has filled a gap in a statute would preserve this historic 
constitutional power. This limited Chevron keeps the courts away from 
the policymaking inherent in gap-filling while restoring the Judiciary’s 
power to “say what the law is.” 
IV. STEP ONE 
Chevron step one asks whether the intent of Congress is clear with 
respect to the specific statutory provision at issue. Yet, the Supreme Court 
has provided rather opaque instructions for step one.165 Is step one a 
purposivist search for “the intent of Congress,” or is it a textualist search 
for whether statutory text prevents the agency’s interpretation?166 How clear 
must Congress’s intent be to foreclose deference at step one? These 
uncertainties lend to the malleability of the Chevron standard of review. 
Empirical work by Kent Barnett and Chris Walker demonstrates that 
the circuit courts continue to leniently apply step one.167 Circuit courts 
conclude their Chevron analyses at step one in thirty percent of cases.168 In 
thirty-nine percent of cases resolved at step one, courts conclude that 
Congress’s clear intent mandated the interpretation adopted by the 
agency.169 When the courts reach step two, they defer to agency 
interpretation at a rate of nearly ninety-four percent.170  
 
 163. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1154 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., 
dissenting) (citation omitted) (“[W]e know Congress may allow the executive to resolve 
‘details’ (like, say, the design of an appropriate tax stamp). Yet Chevron pretty clearly 
involves neither of these kinds of executive functions and, in this way and as a historical 
matter, appears instead to qualify as a violation of the separation of powers.”). 
 164. Wurman, supra note 38, at 37–41. 
 165. Bednar & Hickman, supra note 14, at 1419–20 (parsing the Chevron opinion for 
the meaning of step one). 
 166. Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–843 
(1984). 
 167. Barnett & Walker, supra note 2, at 32–33. 
 168. Id. at 33. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
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The leniency with which courts apply step one alarms anti-
administrativists. Concurring in Pereira v. Sessions, Justice Kennedy 
expressed concerns that persistent leniency results in great abdication of 
judicial power: 
In according Chevron deference to the [agency’s] 
interpretation, some Courts of Appeals engaged in cursory 
analysis of the questions whether, applying the ordinary tools of 
statutory construction, Congress’s intent could be discerned, 
and whether the BIA’s interpretation was reasonable. . . . This 
analysis suggests an abdication of the Judiciary’s proper role in 
interpreting federal statutes.  
The type of reflexive deference exhibited in some of these cases in 
troubling.171 
Anti-administrativists can restore the courts’ power to “say what the 
law is” by strengthening step one. Justice Gorsuch has already begun this 
process by engaging in “Chevron avoidance.” Since joining the Supreme 
Court, Justice Gorsuch has authored the majority opinion in three 
Chevron cases and has never deferred to the agency’s interpretation.172 In 
two cases, Justice Gorsuch applied such a strong step one that it calls into 
question whether Justice Gorsuch would ever find ambiguity. In SAS 
Institute v. Iancu, Justice Gorsuch used traditional textualist tools to reject 
the agency’s interpretation at step one, concluding that “[t]he statutory 
provisions before us deliver unmistakable commands.”173 Justice Gorsuch 
waited to address Chevron’s applicability until after completing this 
interpretive analysis.174 In Wisconsin Central Ltd. v. United States, Justice 
Gorsuch again engaged in a robust textualist analysis to foreclose 
deference at step one.175 Again, he waited until the last moment to cite 
 
 171. Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120–21 (2018) (citations omitted). 
 172. See Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2067, 2074 (2018); Epic Systems 
Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1629–30 (2018); SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 
1358 (2018).  
 173. SAS Inst. Inc., 138 S. Ct. at 1358. For a longer discussion of SAS Institute v. 
Iancu, see Nicholas R. Bednar, Coping with Chevron: Justice Gorsuch’s Majority and 
Justice Breyer’s Dissent in SAS Institute, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Apr. 25, 
2018), http://yalejreg.com/nc/coping-with-chevron-justice-gorsuchs-majority-and-justice-
breyers-dissent-in-sas-institute-by-nicholas-r-bednar [https://perma.cc/W4A6-KC2B]. 
 174. SAS Inst. Inc., 138 S. Ct. at 1358 (“Even under Chevron, we owe an agency’s 
interpretation of the law no deference unless, after ‘employing traditional tools of statutory 
construction,’ we find ourselves unable to discern Congress’s meaning.” (quoting Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984))). 
 175. Wis. Cent. Ltd., 138 S. Ct. at 2070–74. 
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Chevron as the standard of review, stating that the statute was “clear 
enough.”176 
There are three ways to understand Justice Gorsuch’s Chevron-
avoidance approach. First, the Supreme Court is biding its time until it can 
overrule Chevron for good. In SAS Institute Inc., the petitioner argued 
that the Court should “embrace the ‘impressive body’ of pre-Chevron law 
recognizing that ‘the meaning of a statutory term’ is properly a matter for 
‘judicial rather than administrative judgment.’”177 Other justices do not 
seem to sympathize with this plan. Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justice Kavanaugh have noted the important role Chevron plays in 
preventing courts from engaging in policymaking. The Supreme Court 
may have the votes to curb Chevron’s strength, but it likely lacks the votes 
to overturn Chevron. 
Second, the Supreme Court may preserve Chevron as a tool to 
restrain lower-court decision-making while exercising de novo review 
itself.178 Adrian Vermeule states that it “is easy to imagine a situation in 
which the Justices more or less require lower courts to apply Chevron 
(within bounds), but interpret statutes de novo themselves.”179 That the 
Supreme Court would apply a different Chevron standard from the lower 
courts is not unfounded. Kent Barnett and Chris Walker observe notable 
differences between Supreme Court applications (Chevron Supreme) and 
circuit court applications of Chevron (Chevron Regular).180 They argue, 
“Chevron Supreme, with its comparatively broader discretion, will shift 
power from the circuit courts to the Supreme Court and agencies but leave 
Chevron Regular in place to create more certainty in the lower courts and, 
thus, greater national uniformity in federal administrative law.”181 
Moreover, Michael Coenen and Seth Davis argue that there are 
normatively appealing reasons to have two Chevron standards: one for the 
Supreme Court and the other for the lower courts.182 
A dissent from Justice Alito provides reasons to doubt that the 
justices will strike an in camera deal to review agency interpretations de 
novo at the Supreme Court. In Pereira v. Sessions, a majority of eight 
 
 176. Id. at 2074. 
 177. SAS Inst. Inc., 138 S. Ct. at 1358 (citations omitted).  
 178. Barnett & Walker, supra note 151, at 70–73. 
 179. Adrian Vermeule (@Vermeullarmine), TWITTER (July 6, 2018, 8:23 AM), 
https://twitter.com/Vermeullarmine/status/1015255019023667200 [https://perma.cc/GRJ6-
NRMC]. It is rather surreal to cite tweets as sources of debate in administrative law. Yet, 
Twitter has a rather active administrative law community.  
 180. Barnett & Walker, supra note 151, at 70–73. 
 181. Id. at 73. 
 182. See generally Coenen & Davis, supra note 139, at 799–820. 
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Justices concluded that they need not review the statute under Chevron 
because the statute was clear.183 Justice Alito accused the Court of ignoring 
Chevron: 
Although this case presents a narrow and technical issue of 
immigration law, the Court’s decision implicates the status of an 
important, frequently invoked, once celebrated, and now 
increasingly maligned precedent, namely, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. 
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984). . . . Here, a straightforward application of Chevron 
requires us to accept the Government’s construction of the 
provision at issue. But the Court rejects the Government’s 
interpretation in favor of one that it regards as the best reading 
of the statute. I can only conclude that the Court, for whatever 
reason, is simply ignoring Chevron. 
. . . .  
In recent years, several Members of this Court have 
questioned Chevron’s foundations. But unless the Court has 
overruled Chevron in a secret decision that has somehow 
escaped my attention, it remains good law.184 
The third and most likely option is that the Supreme Court simply 
strengthens step one to require an aggressive search for clarity.185  
What does a more searching inquiry look like if the Supreme Court 
limits Chevron to situations where the agency has engaged in gap-filling? 
The existence of a gap implies that the agency may select a policy within a 
range permitted by the statute. However, the agency cannot decide to 
adopt a policy that conflicts with Congress’s clear intent. As revised, step 
one asks whether the agency’s decision falls within the range of permissible 
policy choices.186 The court rejects the agency’s decision if the statute 
prohibits the agency’s interpretation. As Justice Scalia has quipped, “It 
does not matter whether the word ‘yellow’ is ambiguous when the agency 
interpreted it to mean ‘purple.’”187 A textualist formulation would ask 
whether the statute’s text clearly prohibits the agency’s decision. A 
purposivist formulation would ask whether evidence of congressional 
intent and the statute’s purpose clearly prohibit the agency’s decision. 
 
 183. Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2115 (2018). 
 184. Id. at 2121, 2129 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 185. Bednar & Hickman, supra note 14, at 1423. 
 186. Cf. Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 
95 VA. L. REV. 597, 598–600 (2009) (describing two conceptions of step one that work in 
unison). 
 187. 566 U.S. 478, 493 n.1 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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Justice Scalia’s opinion in Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc. 
illustrates what step one looks like when a court reviews an agency’s gap-
filling. That case concerned the EPA’s interpretation of the phrase “best 
technology available” in the Clean Water Act to allow for consideration of 
cost-benefit variances.188 Justice Scalia noted the ambiguity in the phrase 
“best technology available,” which could mean either the technology that 
produces the most of some good or the technology that most efficiently 
produces some good.189 Other provisions of the Clean Water Act expressly 
permit the EPA to conduct a cost-benefit analysis.190 Yet Justice Scalia 
rejected the dissent’s argument that these provisions showed that 
Congress’s silence sought to foreclose a cost-benefit analysis with respect 
to this provision. Justice Scalia stated, “It is eminently reasonable to 
conclude that [the statutory provision’s] silence is meant to convey nothing 
more than a refusal to tie the agency’s hands as to whether cost-benefit 
analysis should be used, and if so to what degree.”191 He therefore 
concluded, “it was well within the bounds of reasonable interpretation for 
the EPA to conclude that cost-benefit analysis is not categorically 
forbidden.”192 
Justice Scalia’s opinion generally shows how step one applies in gap-
filling cases. However, one can imagine that anti-administrativists will more 
easily find that the agency’s hands are tied with a more aggressive step one.  
V. STEP TWO 
Most Chevron skeptics focus on narrowing Chevron’s scope and 
increasing the strength of step one. Indeed, the Supreme Court could 
condense the standard into a single step, stating: “Unless refuted by clear 
language of the statute, a court must defer to the agency interpretation.”193 
As a result, anti-administrativist jurists have paid little attention to 
Chevron’s second step. Yet further refinement of step two may better 
increase judicial oversight of agency policymaking. 
The Supreme Court’s step two analyses lack a coherent pattern from 
which to draw a single meaningful standard. This has led to confusion 
about the substance of step two in the lower courts. Chris Walker and 
 
 188. Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 217 (2009). 
 189. Id. at 218. 
 190. Id. at 221–22. 
 191. Id. at 222. 
 192. Id. at 223. 
 193. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear 
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 618 (1992); see also 
Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 186 (proposing a one-step Chevron). 
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Kent Barnett have recently composed a typology of three ways the lower 
courts apply step two: (1) a hypertextualist approach, (2) a 
hyperpurposivist approach, and (3) an arbitrary-and-capricious approach.194  
A hypertextualist step two uses textualist tools to examine whether the 
agency’s decision is reasonable in light of the statute’s text.195 Some 
commentators lament that a hypertextualist step two conflates steps one 
and two because it is redundant with the interpretive inquiry of step one.196 
Redundancy increases if the anti-administrativists endorse a robust step 
one. Accordingly, a hypertextualist step two offers little for anti-
administrativists who seek more opportunities to scrutinize agency action. 
A hyperpurposivist step two asks whether the agency’s interpretation 
comports with the statute’s purpose.197 An agency’s interpretation that 
conflicts with the statute’s purpose may survive a textualist step one if the 
agency adopts a textually permissible interpretation. A hyperpurposivist 
approach provides courts an opportunity to use purposivist tools—perhaps 
legislative history and substantive canons—that may otherwise fall to the 
wayside at step one. 
A hyperpurposivist approach to step two may appeal to Chief Justice 
Roberts, who emphasizes statutory purpose in statutory interpretation. 
Looking at his decision in King v. Burwell, Stephanie Hoffer and Chris 
Walker note that Roberts “seem[s] to be embracing a brand of 
contextualism that departs from the textualism that has predominated 
during Justice Scalia’s tenure on the Court.”198 In King v. Burwell, Roberts 
emphasized that “[a] fair reading of legislation demands a fair 
understanding of the legislative plan.”199 The hyperpurposivist approach to 
step two asks whether the agency’s interpretation or decision comports 
with that “legislative plan.”  
Finally, step two may embrace the Administrative Procedure Act’s 
arbitrary-and-capricious standard by asking whether the agency arrived at 
its decision through reasoned decision-making.200 Rather than asking 
whether the agency’s interpretation comports with the statute’s text and 
purpose, an arbitrary-and-capricious approach asks whether the agency has 
provided sufficient reasoning to support its interpretation. This approach 
 
 194. Barnett & Walker, supra note 25, at 1451–55. 
 195. Id. at 1451–52. 
 196. Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 186, at 599. 
 197. Barnett & Walker, supra note 25, at 1452–53. 
 198. Stephanie Hoffer & Christopher J. Walker, Is the Chief Justice a Tax Lawyer? 
2015 PEPP. L. REV. 33, 34 (2015).  
 199. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2015). 
 200. Barnett & Walker, supra note 25, at 1454.  
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requires agencies to engage in a traditional policy assessment, such as 
factfinding and cost-benefit analysis, to support its decision. This approach 
ensures that the agency’s interpretation reflects its expertise rather than 
other irrelevant considerations.201  
It is difficult to predict whether the Supreme Court will ultimately 
adopt the hyperpurposivist approach or the arbitrary-and-capricious 
approach. However, if the anti-administrativist Court gets an opportunity 
to refine step two, one should expect that the Court will sharpen step two’s 
teeth. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Chevron—or at least deference more generally—will not go away. This 
article has described the various options an anti-administrativist Supreme 
Court has for creating a more rigorous Chevron standard of review. The 
Supreme Court can restore the power of statutory interpretation to the 
courts by limiting Chevron’s application to situations where an agency has 
filled a gap in the statute. The Court also can prevent agencies from 
exercising substantial policymaking power by invoking the major-questions 
doctrine where Congress has not explicitly called upon the agency to 
decide a significant political and economic issue. Substantively, the Court 
can prevent lower courts from engaging in “reflexive deference”202 by 
clarifying the analytical requirements of Chevron’s two steps. 
The Supreme Court will not necessarily adopt all of these changes. 
However, an anti-administrativist Supreme Court has the potential to 
create an incredibly robust Chevron standard of review without wholly 
eliminating it. Scholars can debate whether all of these limitations make 
Chevron unworkable. However, the ways things stand, it is more likely that 
the Supreme Court will tack additional limitations onto Chevron before 
abandoning the doctrine all together. 
 
 
 201. Catherine M. Sharkey, Cutting in on the Chevron Two-Step, 86 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2359, 2438 (2018). 
 202. Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120–21 (2018). 
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